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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.JA~IEH ~IANPFACTURING CO., 
a <'Orpor.ation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
E. I. \YIL.SOX, 
Defe nda nt-Rrspondent. 
Case No. 
9887 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
BTATEniENT OF FACTS 
At the outset Respondent cannot agree with Ap-
pellant's Statement of the Facts. Indeed, Respondent i~ 
constrained to quote the foHowing fron1 a very recent 
opinion of this Court in the case of Ortega vs. Thomas, 
( F tah 1963) 383 P2d 406 : 
"In setting forth the basis for appeal de-
fendant's counsel have recited the facts according 
to their own view of the evidence. The rule is so 
fundamental that the facts must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the party who prevailed 
below, that it is an indefensible imposition upon 
this court and opposing counsel not to follow it." 
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Xot only has Appellant failed to refer to any of the 
reported testilnony to support the facts stated by it; 
but it has failed to have the entire record transrnitted 
to this Court to enable the Court to asce~tain what the 
faCits are from the record. This likewise leaves counsel 
for Respondent at a distinct disadvantage because he 
cannot refer to portions of the transeript of testimony 
to correct the Statement of Facts reported h~' Appellant. 
On Page 2 of its brief, Appellant states that Mr. 
vVilson contacted Mr. Tuttle, a representative of James 
Manufaeturing Company, .afrter 1\ir. vVilson had seen 
a sample of a turkey feeder consisting of a small section 
in operation at a turkey show in Salt Lake City. This 
does not ten the full story. At the eonferenee with Mr. 
Tuttle in Salt Lake City, Respondent advised that he 
needed equipment which would feed 20,000 to 30,000 
young tur.key poults to be brooded in the coop ·and ade-
quately provide for their needs. l\Ir. Tuttle gave him 
the assurance that the turkey feeder which he had seen 
in a small section of about twelve feet could be and 
would be able to operate in lengths of 400 feet (the en~ire 
length of Mr. Wilson's proposed coop) and that it was 
being successfully operated in other places where it had 
been installed. (Tr. 13) :\lr. Tuttle further stated the 
srnall turkeys would have no trouble eating from the 
larger trough (Tr. 14) ·and Respondent had no reason 
to doubt him because the small length he had seen 
operated was filled to the brim. (Tr. 48) Respondent 
testified that he explained his needs to 1\Ir. Tuttle and 
relied upon Mr. Tuttle's judg1nent .and skill in determin-
2 
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ing whether or not the turkey feeder equip1nent would 
operate so as to provide adequate feed for the small 
turkey poul b. l\Ir. Tuttle also de~igned and en-
gineered for l\lr. Wilson the ventilating systein for Re-
l:;pondent'~ coop and stated that the system would 
properly ventila;te the size coop which Mr. Wilson con-
templated constructing and would maintain and provide 
a uniforn1 te1nperature for the small turkey poults. 
On Page 3 of its brief, Appellant states that frmn 
1952 to 1958 l\Ir. \Vilson dealt with Utah Poultry and 
Farmers Co-op. vVhile this statement is true, the suc-
ceeding s1trutement that 1\-Ir. vVilson purchased James way 
Equipment fron1 Utah Poulltry and Farmers Co-op is 
not correct. l\Ir. Wilson purchased the feeder equipment 
and ventilating equipment (involved in the instant ac-
tion) from Mr. Tuttle, the representative of James 
:Manufacturing Company, Appellant herein. This has 
been the clam of l\Ir. \Vilson from the inception of this 
litigation, and was testified to by him both in his de-
position and in the trial of the case. The fact 1hat the 
equipment was purchased from James 1\-Ianufacturing 
Company through its representative Ray Tuttle was also 
acknowledged by Appellant in a letter which it wrote 
to .Mr. \Yilson on April 7, 1959. This letter appears as 
an Exhibit introduced in evidence both by Appellant 
and Respondent. (Exhibit P-9 and Exhibit No. D-7) In 
this letter, which was written by A. F. Kellenburg of 
the Appellant company to l\Ir. E. I. Y{ilson, the follow-
ing state1nent appears: 
3 
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''::\Ir. Ray Tuttle, who sold this eq_u,ipme11t, i:s, 
of course, very familiar with the use of 26-inch 
ceiling exhaust fans and roof ventilators." (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
It is, therefore, apparent that the state1nent on 
Page 3 of Appellant's brief that "~Ir. Wilson arranged 
to purchase fron1 Utah Poultry and Farn1ers Coopera-
tive eight 26 inch ceiling fans" is also incorrect. 
Again on Page 3 Appellant states that on February 
21, 1958, Mr. Wilson met in the office of Utah Poultry 
with various representatives of Appellant company and 
the Utah Poultry, at which time a discussion ensued con-
cerning the praeticality of using the feeder equipment 
sold by James Manufacturing Company. However, as 
stated on Page ± of the Statement of Faets, "Mr. Wilson 
denied this eonversation and clai1ns that it never took 
place." This is just one of a nu1nber of ins,tances in 
which the evidence is in conflict. 
Appellant refers to its Exhibit, P-15, as being evi-
dence of the fact that Respondent purchased the equip-
melllt from Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-operative 
rather than from Appellant eompany. The Exhibit in 
ques1tion merely indicates that it was billed to ~Ir. "\Vii-
son's account by Utah Poultry. ::\Ir. Wilson's testimony 
.and other exhibits show that Respondent was being 
financed during the 1958 turkey-growing season by Utah 
Poultry and that all purchases 1nade by hin1 were ap-
proved for financing and paid by Utah Poultry, includ-
ing the purchase of turkey poults and other equipment. 
The invoice referred to was issued by l'tah Poultry to 
4 
j 
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Hesponclent in order to charge the itern to the latter'~ 
arcount. 
Again on Page -l- of the Appellant's brief appears 
t!tP ~tatement that "'~lr. \\Tilson built the turkey brooder 
coop and installed the ventilator S~'stern himself." vVhile 
tlti~ i~ true, it is also true that the ventilating systmn 
was designed by .Mr. Ray Tuttle, a representative of 
.James .Manufacturing Company; and the plans and 
dra\vings were given to :Mr. "\Vilson, who installed the 
ventilating systmn in accordance with such design and 
plan and upon the representation by ~Ir. Tuttle that the 
ventilating equipment would properly ventilate and con-
trol the air in the turkey brooding coop. There is no 
question but that both the ventilating system and the 
feeding units were installed as they were supposed to be 
installed, but the issue was whether they worked pro-
perly. Although the ventilating systen1 appeared to work 
satisfactorily, it in fact pennitted drafts of air to de-
scend upon the srnall turkey poults in one area of the 
coop while air was being withdrawn through the ventila-
tors in anO'ther area of the coop thereby chilling the 
turkey poults and causing their death. 
vVith respect to the feeding equipment, when the 
feeding equipment was ins~talled in len~ths of 400 feet 
as it was originally intended should be done, the worm-
auger designed to carry and distribute the turkey feed 
uniformly throughout the length of the coop failed to 
work properly and distribute adequate quantities of feed 
along the trough. Respondent's evidence was to the 
effect that the augers would not push the feed rnore than 
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approxi1nately fifty feet. (Tr. 17) This was the testi-
n1ony not only of l\lr. Wilson but also of other witnesses. 
rrhere is no question but that the representatives of 
James Manufaeturing Company cmne to Nephi to at-
tempt to get the feeder equip1nent to work properly. In 
fact, there is a dispute in the testin1ony as to wheher 
it worked properly when they left, while :\11'. Wilson 
denied that it did. (Tr. 51) 'Thereafter, Resopndent spent 
considerable time and effort in trying to 1nodify the 
auger so as to get the equipment to work. (Tr. 21-27) 
As late as September 1958 Respondent was still adjust-
ing the equipment. Exhibit D-14 is an invoice sho-wing 
a purchase by Respondent from Appellant of 7 .augers 
which were being modified and "leaded in" to 1nake the 
equip1nent work at all. By this process of adjustment 
and the repeated changing of these .augers and adjusting 
them to the equipment irt was finally possible to get them 
to work to some extent out in the field, although they 
never did work in the brooding coop. (Tr. 50) 
On Page 6 of its brief, Appellant states that after 
the alleged defect in the feeding units w.as discovered 
there was a conversation between :.Mr. Wilson and l\Ir. 
Tuttle at 1\:fr. Wilson's turkey ranch in Nephi, Utah, 
on or about March 10, 1958. Appellant states: '"At this 
tin1e no complaint or n1ention of the defects in either 
the ventilrutor system or the turkey feeder units was 
Inade to Mr. Tuttle." This is not the fact. l\lr. vVilson 
testified and claimed throughout these proceedings that 
complaint was made to the James l\ianufacturing Com-
pany representatives of the defective feeder equipment, 
that they sent representatives up to atten1pt to ma:ke 
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the equipntent work, and that they failed to get it to 
work by the time that they left, so that they were aware 
at that time of the defective condition of the feeding 
equiprnent and of :Mr. vVilson's claim in respect thereto. 
('Tr. 51) Concerning the ventilating equipment, it is true 
that no cl.airn was rnade until the early spring of 1959 
~ince it wa~ not discovered until February of 1959 that 
the ventilating equiprnent was functioning improperly. 
A~ ~the testirnony in the case discloses, drafts were 
created because the ventilators were not equipped with 
dampers to prevent a back draf1t when they were not 
working. 
The statement on Page 6 of Appellant's brief that 
"jir. vVilson asked :Mr. Tuttle if James Manufacturing 
Company would sell these units to him direct -and finance 
the units for him" (referring to other turkey feeders 
·which were subsequently purchased) leaves a false irn-
pression. It is true that Mr. Wilson purchased these 
units fronr James l\1:anufacturing Company just as he 
purchased :the other feeding equipment and ventilating 
equipment frorn James Manufacturing Company. The 
only difference was that the first units were financed 
through l~tah Poultry while the last purchase was fi-
nanced by James :Manufacturing Company. According 
to Respondent, at no time did he purchase any James 
:Manufacturing Company equipment frorn the Utah Poul-
try and Farmers Co-operative. 
Appellant's brief goes on to state purported facts 
with reference to Respondent's failure to give notice of 
the alleged defective equipment and his claim in respect 
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thereto. However, we must again advise the Court that 
all of the testirnony with respect to this rnaHer is not 
before the Court. Respondent testified that he advised 
the Appellant cornpany representatives from tirne to 
time of the defeCJtive equiprnent and his clain1 in respect 
thereto. Appellant refers to several iten1s of corTes-
pondence between the parties as indicating that no claim 
was n1ade by Respondent. However, the first letter dated 
October 2, 1958 from Respondent to James io.Ianufactur-
ing Cmnpany's Reliable divi~on at Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia (Exhibit P-4) contains the following statement: 
"After I had to ta:ke out your automatic 
feeders frorn my coop I had to buy another type 
to replace it, and that is what has caused me to 
have to change rny plans on the way I will be able 
to pay for this. I thought at the time that I had 
to make this change, that I told you and Ray Tut-
tle that there would have to be some changes in 
the arrangements to pay, but from what I can 
gather from Mark Adamson that doesn't seem to 
be the case." 
This was not the first notice that the feeder equip-
nlent was defective. The rnatter was first brought to 
the attention of Appellant when the feeders were in-
stalled in the coop in :March of 1958 and during the 
subsequent atten1pts to correct the feeding equipment 
so as to get it to work. 
Finally, Appellant on Page 7 and 8 of its brief 
refers to testimony elicited from Dr. Toyal A. Bagley 
concerning the cause of death of various turkeys. vVhile 
Dr. Bagley testified that from time to tirne he "posted" 
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(that i~, exainined dead birds by an autopsy) and de-
tennined that certain specific birds showed evidence of 
certain diseases or conditions suffcient to cause dewth, 
he also testified that thPre ·were 1nany birds examined 
that did not show definite signs of disease or evidenced 
conditions which could have been caused by draft or 
improper ventilation. Nor was he the only person to 
testify on this 1natter. Not only did ~Ir. Wilson testify 
concerning death from piling up, smotthering, and other 
causes directly attributable to the defective feeding 
e<tuipment and the ventilating equipment, but also others 
experienced in the busisness of brooding and raising 
turkeys teSttified concerning their opinion as to the cause 
of death. :K one of this testimony is before the Court. 
In fact, it is significant to point out that the trial of this 
case lasted a total of four days, durng which numerous 
witnes~e~ were called by the Respondent as well as sev-
eral by Appellant. The tes'tin1ony of none of these wit-
nesses has been transcribed and reported to this Court. 
Only a small part of the testimony of _Mr. Wilson is in 
the record. 
The foregoing 1n brief points out the differences 
between Respondent and Appellant as to what the facts 
of this case are; and since the record is not before the 
Court i't must be presu1ned that the evidence supports 
the verdict below. 
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STA·TEMENT OF POINTS 
Respondent will discuss the various points raised 
by Appellant in its brief in the same order under the 
following headings: 
POINT I 
ALLEGED ERROR IN ORDERING A JURY TRIAL 
OVER OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II 
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN EXCLUDING 
ONE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES FROM THE COURT-
ROOM WHEN PLAINTIFF INVOKED THE EXCLUSION 
RULE. 
POINT III 
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN ADMITTING 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 8. 
POINT IV 
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN FAILING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 'TO DISMISS AT THE END 
OF DEFENDANT'S CASE AND IN FAILING TO GRANT 
A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
POINT V 
ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS. 
POINT VI 
ALLEGED ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAIN-
TIFF A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALLEGED ERROR IN ORDERING A JURY TRIAL 
OVER OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF. 
10 
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A. ppellant in its brief sta1tes that it requested a non-
jnry trial, and refers to its Notice of Readiness as evi-
dence thereof. \Vhile this writer has not seen the original 
X otice which was filed (it is apparently not with the 
record in the Supreme Court), he has seen the copy 
which wa~ served upon hin1 as counsel for R.espondent, 
and that fonn does not show that either a jury or a 
non-jury trial is requested. In fact, that particular line 
is left blank so that both the words "non" and "jury" 
appear before the word "trial." 
\Yhile counsel for Appellant now clairns that he was 
prejudiced by a jury trial, he points to nothing in the 
record which would so indicate nor does he show that he 
was unable to prepare for trial before a jury. Actually 
he should have been aware of the fact that the case \Vas 
to be 'tried before a jury on or about Septe1nber 11 when 
he received a copy of the letter sent to the trial judge 
referring to the fact that the jury fee had been paid. 
He admits he became aware of it on October 24, six days 
before the trial. Thereafter, the Court further advised 
counsel for Appellant that if he felt he would be unable 
to be ready for trial by October 30, the trial could be 
continued in order to give him more tin1e adequately 
to prepare. At that time Appellant's position was that 
Respondent was not entitled to a jury trial because 
no proper demand had been made and not because of 
any inconvenience or hardship. 
This Court has on several occasions had before it 
the question of whether a jury trial should be allowed 
where no proper demand has been made ; and in ea:ch 
1 1 
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instance it has held that the granting or denial oi' a 
jury trial is within the discretion of the trial court. 
In the case of Wood vs. B. G. W. By. Co., 28 U 351, 
79 P 182, the Court held that the granting of a jury trial 
when no proper demand had been made wa~ discretion-
ary with the trial court. \V e quote : 
"We are of the opinion that the court below 
possessed discretionary authority to direct a trial 
by jury notwithstanding the parties to the suit 
may have waived the san1e." 
In the case of Davis vs. D. & B. G. Ry. Co., 45 U 11, 
1-12 P 705, the Court held : 
''Finally it is contended that the court erred 
in penni tting a jury to be called to try the case 
for ~the reason that the jury fee was not paid until 
a few minutes before the case was called for trial. 
Our constitution (article 1, 10) provides: 'A 
jury in civil cases shall be waived unless de-
manded.' Comp. Laws 1907, 3129, among other 
things, provides that a jury must be demanded 
in writing 'prior to the time of setting such action 
for trial, or within such reasonable time there-
af1ter as the cou1i. n1ay order, or orally in open 
court at the time of such setting,' and the party 
demanding a jury 'must at the same time deposit 
wi1th the clerk the sum of $5.00, whereupon it 
shall be the duty of the court to order jurors to 
be in attendance at the time set for the trial of 
the cause.' In this case a jury was properly de-
manded, but the fee was not paid except as above 
stated. The pttrpose of the demand, as appears 
from the foregoing statute, .is to enable the court 
to have a jury in attendance when the case cornes 
on for trial. We think that where a jury is in fact 
present so that the trial may forthwith proceed 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wHhout delay, the .adverse party cannot succes:::;-
fully interpose the objection that the jury has not 
been demanded or the jury fee paid in the precise 
manner and at the precise time prscribed by the 
statute. The provisions in the statute are not 
i nt (>nd e:d for the benefit of an adversary. X o 
doubt if the de1nand and payment are not made 
as required hy the statute ·the party has waived 
hi~ right to require the court to call a jury, but 
we cannot see how the adverse party can complain 
if the court, in its discretion, permits a jury to 
try the case if one is in fact in attendance and no 
delay is occasioned in proceeding with the case. 
In our judgment, ,,·here a jury is in attendance 
the court may permit a party to pay the jury fee 
at an~· time before a trial, and may impanel a 
jury to tr~· the case. In principle we see no dif-
ference between the case at bar and Ogden Valley. 
etc., Co. v. Lewis, 125 Pac. 687, where we held 
the question of calling a jury, where the right to 
de1nand one has been waived, to be largely within 
the discretion of the· court, and that the calling 
of a jury b~· the court to try a case where a jury 
has been waived is not error." (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant cites no authority in support of its clain1, 
but counsel does state that he "·as "prohibited from ob-
taining a new panel under provision 78-46-23." There 
can be no justlfication for this statement, because under 
the provisions of Section 78-46-23, U.C.A. 1953 any per-
son may obtain a new jury venire by paying the fee 
prescribed by the statute not later than the day preced-
ing the trial. In the instant ease Appellant had five days 
after receiving actual notice of the fact that the case was 
to be tried to a jury in \Vhich to determine wh~her it 
was satisfied with the regular panel or whether to ask 
for a special venire. 
13 
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As the trial court advised Appellant's counsel, there 
being no rule in the 5th Judicial District fixing any time 
in which a Demand for a Jury Trial Inust be made, the 
Court had as a practice granted a jury trial when re-
q"ll;ested at any time prior to the date set for the trial. 
POINT II 
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN EXCLUDING 
ONE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES FROM THE COURT-
ROOM WHEN PLAINTIFF INVOKED THE EXCLUSION 
RULE. 
Appellant contends rthat it was prejudiced by the 
Court excluding all of the witnesses from the Courtroom, 
including a witness which Appellant planned to use as 
its chief witness for a "substantial part of the trial". 
"\Vhile it is true that the Court, upon Appellant's request, 
did exclude all witnesses, including Ray Tuttle, a sales 
representative for Appellant Cmnpany, ,,~ho had most of 
t~e negotiations and conversations with Respondent con-
cerning the purchase of the equipment, it was not for a 
substantial part of the trial. The trial lasted four days 
during which Respondent was on the witness stand for 
approxima;tely a day and a half. ~1r. Tuttle was actually 
absent from the courtroom less than an hour during the 
early part of ~lr. vVilson's testilnony. The record before 
the Court discloses that ~the Court convened at 1:30 in 
the afternoon of October 30th after having impaneled the 
jury in the forenoon. (Tr. 2) At that time the motion 
to exclude the witnesses was n1ade by Appellant's coun-
sel and a considerable discussion took place between 
counsel and the Court concerning whether l\fr. Tuttle 
should also be excluded if other witnesses were excused. 
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This involved smne ti1ne as the record shows. (Tr. 2-8) 
rrhereaft<>r, counsel for Defendant made his opening 
~tate1nent which took up a subs,tantial period of time so 
that :\I r. \rilson had jus1t begtm to testify at the time of 
the afternoon reces~. As a rna.tter of fact, as stated hy 
Appellant in its briPf, objection was made to the testi-
mony of .Mr. Wilson with respect to his conversation with 
~[r. Tuttle because 11r. Tuttle was not in the courtroom 
and it wa~ at this point that the, Court took the afternoon 
recess.- Upon convening after the recess, the Court 
allO\n~cl .Mr. TutHe to come into the courtroom over 
Respondent's objection, the Court stating: 
"THE COURT: The record should show in 
that regard that pending the recess Mr. Howard 
has exhibited to the Court a Supreme Court case 
in the State of Utah which in substance and effect 
provides that the Court within its discretion may 
permit a representative of the party to be in the 
Conrtroom even though the exclusion rule has 
been £n t·oked; and :Mr. H.oward has chosen ~Ir. 
Ray Tuttle and therefore the Court in its discre-
tion has permitted him to return to the Court-
room. And your objecion is denied at this point." 
(Tr. 12-13) (Emphasis added.)) 
A~ the trial court pointed out, in the case of Xana-
kis t·s. Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., 1 U2d 299, 265 P2d 
100, this Court held that it is discretionary with the trial 
court whether a representative of the opposing party 
ma~T remain the courtroom although he is not an officer 
and may he used as a witness. However, it is significant 
to point out that in the Xanakis Case the Plaintiff had 
invoked the exclusion rule; and the Defendant requested 
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the privilege of retaining one person in the courtroom. 
In the present instance, it was the Plaintiff who asked 
that the rule he invoked .and at the san1e' time claimed the 
right to an exception thereto. As stated in 53 Am. Jur. 
THIALS, Section 32, Page 47: 
"lt has been said that where the rule regard-
ing the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom 
is invoked, unless some good reason is shown, all 
of the witnesses should he included." 
This is in keeping with the provisions of Rule 43(f) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides : 
"Upon motion of ei~ther party, the court shall 
exclude from the courtroom any witness of the 
adverse party, not at the time under examination, 
so thart he may not hear the testimony of the other 
witnesses." 
To the same effeCJt is Section 78-7-4, U.C.A. 1953, 
which provides in part : 
"In .any cause the Court may, in its discre-
tion, during the examination of a witness exclude 
any and all other witnesses in the cause." 
Appellant does nort show any prejudice by the wit-
ness being absent from the courtro01n. As a matter of 
fact, the testimony elicited from Respondent during the 
tin1e that Ray Tuttle was absent fron1 the courtroom was 
preliminary and did not relate to any 1natters whlch 
would have been of direct concern to :Mr. Tuttle. How-
ever, if counsel for Appellant h.ad been really concerned, 
he could have obtained a transcript of that testimony 
frmn the court reporter with very little expense. 
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POINT III 
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN ADMITTING 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 8. 
\Yltile Appellant's point is that ·the CouDt improperl~T 
admitted Defendant's Exhibit 8 over the objection of the 
Plaintiff, the discussion in the brief goes to the merits 
of the controversy and particularly to the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain this verdict. Unfortunately the 
tP~timony relating to this rnaHer has no't been tran-
f1cribed and submitted to this Court as a part of the 
record. However, Respondent will present this matter 
under Point IY and lin1it the present discussion to the 
issue expre~sed in the heading, whether the trial court 
erred in admitting into evidence Defendant's Exhibit 
~~o. 8. "\Vhile all of the evidence does not appear to 
have been transcribed \\Tith respect to this matter (Re-
spondent'~ testimony on cross-exmnination as to when 
he located his cop~T of the letter and the circumstances 
surrounding ih; being \\Titten), the initial proceedings 
under which the Exhibit was offered and received do 
appear to be transcribed and before this Court. (See 
Tr. pp 37 -42) 
In hi;:; Interrogatories to the Plaintiff, Defendant 
requested the Plaintiff to answer any written corres-
pondence had taken place between the parties in respect 
to the perforrnance or use of the equipment or the alleged 
failure of such equip1nent to function properly, and 
asked that copies of all such correspondence whether 
sent or received be attached to the answer. (R. 11) In 
its Answers to such inquiry, Appellant stajted that one 
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letter, dated October 2, 1958, was attachd and went on 
to say, "This does not purpovt to be all of ,the corres-
pondence which l\1r. 'Vilson 1nay have engaged in with 
representatives of Jmnes ~Ianufacturing Company. It 
does represent the only correspondence presently lo-
cated at the hon1e office." (Tr. 18) 
Again rut the trial Respondent called upon Appellant 
to produce the original copy of the letter which Re-
spondent testified had been sent to it. Appellant did 
not do so and in faCit did not at any time during the 
trial, which lasted for four days, ever attempt to explain 
why the original of the letter was not produced in court. 
Under such circumstances the Exhibit (a carbon copy of 
a letter sent to Appellant by Respondent) would have 
been admissible as secondary evidence of the contents of 
the original letter. See Sec. 78-25-16, U.C.A. 1953. How-
ever, this Coui'It has previously adopted the view that a 
carbon copy of a document made in connection with the 
typing of the original thereof is of equal effect as the 
original copy and may be received in evidence without 
first es~tablishing the whereabouts of the original copy. 
In the case of De Michele vs. Insurance Company, 
40 U 312, 120 P 846, this Court laid down the rule of 
law which has since been applied in this state in respect 
to the admissability of a carbon copy of a docun1ent: 
"In International Harvester Co. of America 
vs. Elfstrom, 101 Minn. 263, 112 N. W. 252,- 12 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 343, 118 Am. St. Rep. 626, 11 Ann. 
Cas. 107, the rule that gove~rns under such cir-
cumstances is stated in the headnote as follows: 
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·· 'The different ntunbers or i1npressions of a 
writing produced by placing carbon paper be-
tween shee1ts of paper and writing upon the ex-
posed surface are duplicate originals and either 
ma~T be introduced in evidence without accounting 
for the nonproduc1tion of the other.' 
"A mere' inspection of the proofs of loss kept 
by llir. Davis, .a duplicate of which had been 
served on lli r. Brummitt, discloses that it was 
what is eommonly called a carbon copy and was 
thus a duplicate original within the rule s1t.ated 
by the Supreine Court of l\finnesota in the Elf-
strom Case just referred to. The precise question 
here involved was before the Missouri Court of 
Appeals in Catron v. Ins. Co., 67 Mo. App. 544. 
In that case the copy of the proofs of loss that 
was retained by the insured was, over the objec-
tion of the c01npany, admitted in evidence with-
out serving notice upon the company to produce 
the one served upon it and without aecounting 
for that one. The court held that the paper was 
properly admitted in evidence under the rule 
which applies to duplicate originals. To the, same 
effect is the case of Westbrook v. Fulton, 79 Ala. 
510. The district court, therefore, did not err in 
adn1itting in evidenee respondent's proofs of 
loss." 
See also American Surety Company vs. Blake, 54 
Idaho 1, :27 P:2cl 972, where the Court held that a carbon 
impression of a letter which was testified was mailed to 
the Plaintiff cmnpany was ad1nissible without showing 
that a previous demand had been made upon the com-
pany to produce the original, quoting from two cases 
from other jurjsdictions, .as follows: 
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''In the ease of ::\Iartin & Lanier Paint Co. v:-~. 
Daniels, 27 Ga. App. 302, 108 S. E. 2-tG, the 
second paragraph of the sylabus reads: 'Dupli-
cate or carbon copies of letters made by· the same 
pencil at the smne time are not 'copies', but dupli-
cate originals, and could be introduced in evidence 
without notice to produce.' In the case of Pres-
cott, Wright, Snider Co. v. Cit)? of Cherryvale, 
134 Kan. 53 4 P. (2d) 457, 459, the court uses this 
language: 'The carbon impression of the leHer 
wri1tten on a typewriter made with the same 
stroke of the :keys as was done here may be 
treated as original, and hence either may be re-
ceived as primary evidence.'" 
Re~·pondent subn1its that it was not necessary to 
1nake a prior den1and upon Appellant for production of 
the original cop)· of the letter; but that in any event such 
a de1nand was made through the Interrogatories and at 
the ti1ne of trial, and tha1t Appellant had adequate time 
to have searched its records to see if it had the original 
of the leNer, the carbon copy of which was introduced in 
evidence. 
POINT IV 
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN FAILING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END 
OF DEFENDANT'S CASE AND IN FAILING TO GRANT 
A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The general rulP as to the review of the weight and 
suffidene)· of the evide·nce where a full report of the 
evideneP is not brought to the attention of the reviewing 
court is well stated in 4 Am. J11r. :2d, APPEAL AXD 
ERROR, See. 52:3, p. 958, as follows: 
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"The -wPight and sufficiency of the evidence 
cannot ordinarily be reviewed unless all of the 
evidence is hrought before the appellaA:e court by 
a bill of exceptions or i'ts equivalent." 
The cases cited under this staten1ent include the ease 
of Sandall rs. Sa11dal1, 57 F. 150, 193 P 1093, 15 ALR 
G:20, cleeided b~· this Court in 1920. As there stated by 
this CouPt, allPged error as to the insufficiency of the 
Pvidence will not be considered b~· the Court on appeal 
where the evidence is not reported to the Court, citing 
numerous 1 ~tah easP~. The rnost recent ease on this point 
i:-; I11 Re r' oorhees Estate, 12 U 2d 361, 366 P2d 977, 
where tht• Court held that since no transcript of the hear-
ing -was n1ade and submitted to the Supren1e Court the 
findings of the trial court would be assumed to be sup-
ported h~· the evidence. 
This is in keeping also with the statement of law 
found in 4 .Am. Jur . .2d, APPEAL AXD ERROR, Section 
.):2:3, p. 959, as follows: 
··If the evidence is not in the record, the pre-
sunlption is that it was sufficient to sustain the 
judgment, and that it supported all Findings of 
Fact and all facts pleaded and essential to the 
judgment. If only part of the evidence is in the 
record, the presumption is that the omitted evi-
dence supports the judgment, and that it is suf-
ficient to cure any defects in the evidence brought 
up." 
In the case of Orand Truck R. Co. z:s. Cumming.s, 
106 P.R. 700, :2/ L.ed 266, 1 S. Ct. 493, the Supren1e Court 
of the l-nited States held that although a refusal to 
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direct a verdiet for the Defendant at the close of Plain-
tiff's evidence rnay have been error at the time, when the 
Defendant afterward introduced evidence in his own be-
half, \vhich is not in the record on appeal, it must be 
presun1e that at the close of the case the evidence wa~ 
sufficient to go to the jury. 
Appellant contends that there could be no breach of 
warranty for the feeder units for five reasons, which 
are set forth on page 19 of its brief. These reasons 
represent Appellant's position during the trial but un-
fortunately for it the jur~- did not accept its theory but 
found the evidence in favor of Respondent. 
1. Appellant rlairns the auger-type feeder units 
\H're sold to Respondent b~- rtah Poultry and Farmers 
Co-op and not by Plaintiff. Tlris ·was an issue which 
,,·as subrnitted to the jury (See Instruction 19, R-58) and 
resolved against the Plaintiff. As a rnatter of fact, the 
tefltimon~- of Respondent as well as the docun1entary evi-
dence in this case shows that the feeder units were pur-
chased fron1 Jmneswa)- Jfanufaduring Company through 
its agent Ray Tuttle (See Exhibits P-9 and D-7). 
2. Appellant elaims Defendant purchased the 
feeder units based upon his observation of a sample. This 
is not correct. Respondent testified that he contacted 
Ray Tuttle, Appellant\; representative, because he had 
seen a twelve-foot section of the feeder unit in operwtion 
and wa . ..; intPrPsted in it, but that he bought the unit 
based upon the representations n1ade to hin1 by Ray 
Tuttle that the auger-type equipment would push the 
feed for a distance of 400 feet filling the trough with 
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fred ~o that the sn1a1l turkey poults could eat ~therefrom. 
(Tr. 13, 1-t, -t8) 
3. Appellant further claims the buyer was an ex-
perienced turlwy operator who ordered a particular 
piece of Inerchandise for his own purposes. vV e agree 
that Respondent was an experienced turkey operator, but 
he was not an experienced equipment 1nan and went to 
Ha~· Tuttle, who wa~ a sales representative, in order to 
determine whetlwr the equipn1ent which he had seen 
would be suitable for his operation and meet his needs. 
This is si1nilar to the situation involved in the case of 
Carver vs. Dunn, 117 U. 180, 214 P2d, 118, where William 
(;. Carver of Carver Sheet ttietal W or:ks in connection 
with air conditioning equipn1ent which the latter com-
pany thereafter sold and installed. rpon a subsequent 
claim being made by Carver that he was an installer 
onl~y rather than a seller, the Supreme Court sustained 
a finding of the trial court that: ''The implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose is not negatived by 
the Seller's use of a brand name when it is used merely 
for convenience in identifying the equipment to be in-
stalled." 
Likewise the Court rejected the clain1 of the Plaintiff 
in that case that he was merely an installer instead of 
a seller and that the purchaser did not rely upon the 
judg~nent and skill of the seller in respect to the equip-
ment purchased. 
-±. Appellant next clai1ns that Respondent gave no 
notice o.f the alleged breach of "~arranty. This is not 
the case, as the testimony and the docu1nents before 
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the trial court would show. However, \Ye submit that 
the matter was properly submitted to the jur~: and that 
the jury found the issue against the Appellant in that 
respect. Instruction X o. 25 (R. 65) reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that in order to find 
in favor of the defendant and against the plain-
tiff on the defendant'~ counterclai1n yon must 
find that the defendant gave notice to the plain-
tiff of the alleged breach of prmnise or warranty 
within a reasonable tin1e after he knew, or should 
have known, of such breach of pron1ise or \\·ar-
ranty; and you are further instructed that the 
notice of breach of warranty need take no special 
fonn, however, it n1ust refer to particuar sales 
so far as that is practicable, it must fairly advise 
the seller of the alleged defects, and it must be 
such as to repel any reference that the buyer has 
waived the said defects. It must further advise 
the seller that the buyer intends to look to him 
for dmnages for breach." 
5. Finally, Appellant clai1ns that Respondent is 
estopped from clain1ing a breach because of his utiliza-
tion of the equipment. Of course, the statute specifically 
provides that a buyer of equipn1ent 1nay retain the 
equipinent 'vithout '"~aiving his clailn for dmnages. ~PP 
Section 60-3-9, U.C.A. 1953. 
Appellant contends not only that the evidence is 
insufficient to show notice of clain1ed breach of warranty 
in respect to the feeder equip1nent but also in respect 
to the ventilator equipment which was purchased and 
installed in February of 1958. As shown by the testi-
n1ony in this case, discovery of the defective ventilating 
equipn1ent did not ta:ke place until February 1959. (See 
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Exhibit D-9) The testin1ony \Yhich has not been trans-
cribed would disclose that in the forepart of February, 
1959, Respondent was told by Dr. Royal Bagley, (the 
vetinarian who had n1ade several inspections of the 
coop .and the turkeys, during the 1958 season to attempt 
to discover the cause of the high death loss) that during 
an inspedion in Jan nary 1959 he had observed a down-
ward draft through the ventilators. Respondent innned-
iately checked the ventilating system and determined 
that \\·hen ventilators in one part of the coop were in 
operation discharging air fron1 the coop, air would 
be drawn through other ventilators in another part of 
the coop because there were no dmnpers to shut out the 
air. It was further discovered that the canyon breezes 
which were prevalent during the night time ·would blow 
air down through the ventilators into the coops directly 
onto the small turkeys that were then being brooded 
in the coops. IIm11ediately steps were taken to correct 
the situation by the installation of damper-like devices 
to prevent the air from being drawn into the coops. As 
Exhibit D-9 discloses the 1nortality very quickly subsided 
to practically none. 
Appellant states 1n its brjef on page 33 that ""it 
seems lmbelievable that a person ·would have lost up-
wards of 30,000 young poults without discovering the 
cause of it." However, there was considerable testimony 
as to the atte1npts made to ascertain the cause of the 
high mortality. Dr. Bagley and others were called in 
to assist in determining the cause of the loss but the 
real cause \Yas not discovered until February 1959. 
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Respondent does not question the provisions of 
the statute (Section 60-3-9, U.C.A. 1953) requiring notiee 
to the seller of the breach of a prmnise or warranty 
within a reasonable time "after the buyer knows, or 
ought to ~kno\v, of such breach." \Vhether such notice 
has been given, however, is ordinarily a question for 
the jury. In the case of Baum vs. 1llnrray, 23 \Yash. 
2d 890, 162 P2d 801 (cited with approval by this Court 
in Mawlvvnney vs. Jensen, 120 U. 142, 232 P2d 769) ap-
pears the following: 
"The appellant urges that even though it be 
held that the notice given \Vas sufficient it wa~ 
not given within a reasonable ti1ne and hence 
usually a mixed question of law and fact. It 
depends upon such a variety of facts and circum-
stances in each particular case that it usually 
resolves itself into a question of fact to be de-
termined by the jury upon proper instruction~ 
by the court. . . . 
Although it n1ay be said that the facts as 
to when the notice was given are not in dispute, 
reasonable n1inds Illa)· well differ as to the con-
clusion to be drawn frmn then1, and that being 
the case we would not be justified in holding as 
a 1natter of law that the notice either was or was 
not given within a reasonable tilne." 
~The Washington court also went on to say that in 
giving notice all that is necessary is that the Seller 
be informed of the facts in some 1nanner sufficient to 
advise him that a clain1 is being 1na.de to that effect so 
that tlw Seller may govern hhnself accordingly. 
Appellant has quoted frmn the annotation in 41 
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ALR 2<1. S 1:2, 817, but failed to quote that portion of 
the annotation relating to whether the issue is one for 
the court or the jury. At page 825 of the annotation 
appears he following general state1nent: 
"Usually, the question of what constitutes 
a reasonable time for the buyer to give notice 
to the seller of a breach of an express warranty, 
is one of fact for the jury. It has been so held 
or recognized in the following cases:" 
Thereafter appear a great nu1nber of cases frmu various 
jurisdictions, including California, Georgia, Illinois, 
.Jiassachusetts, .Michigan, X ew York, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode, Island and Wisconsin. 
In the case of Whitfield vs. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 
193 P2d 1, the Supreme Court of California states: 
"Having in mind the appropriate rule under 
this provision of the law of sales, that 'It 1nay 
be taken as axiomatic that what constitutes a 
reasonable time must be determined from the 
particular circumstances in the individual case' 
(Columbia Axle Co. v. Arnerican Auto1nobile Ins. 
Co., supra, 63 F.2d at page 208), this court can-
not say as a n1atter of law that an unreasonable 
tilne had elapsed. Certainly the time did not 
commence to run before :Mrs. 'Vhitfield knew the 
disease ·was undulant fever .... What constitutes 
a reasonable time where the goods sold are foods 
containing latent defects, which are in1mediately 
consumed, presents a different question than does 
the ordinary sale where the article is subject to 
examination and use which will reveal its defect." 
A Fortiori when all of the evidence as to the tin1e 
and nature of the notice g1ven for the alleged breach 
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of warranty is not before this Court, the rul<· stated 
in 4 Am. Jur. 2d. APPEAL AXD ERROR, Section 5:23, 
applies, to the effect that the weight and sufficienc~· 
of the evidence 'vill be presu1ned in favor of t lit> judg-
ment. 
Respondent respectfully sub1nits that there was no 
error committed by the trial court in refusing Appel-
lant's motion for dismissal or 1notion for a directed 
verdict. 
POINT V 
ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS. 
Complaint is n1ade that the court erred 1n giving 
certain instructions to the jury. Although the instruc-
tions given by the court are in the record on appeal, 
there is nothing in the record to indicate to which of 
these instructions, if any, Appellant ~cepted. Rule 5 
of the Utah Rules of Ciril Procedure provides that "No 
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to 
give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In object-
ing to the giving of an instruction, a party n1ust state 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
of his objection." 
\Vhile the Rule further states that notwithstanding 
the foregoing requirement this Court 1nay in its discre-
tion and in the interests of justice consider alleged error 
in the giving or failure to give of instructions, there 
is no wa~· for this Court to know whether the instructions 
were or were not proper without having the evidence 
before it on which the instructions were based. 
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Again referring to -!Am. Jur. 'l.d APPEAL AN"D 
ERROR, Sedion 536, we find the following statement 
of law: 
"Insofar as the correctness of the charge 
1nay turn on evidence, its correctness is not open 
to consideration on appeal when the evidence 
i8 not in the record, at least where there is no 
sufficient state1nent of facts showing what the 
evidence tended to prove or that it raised the 
questions on which the instructions are based." 
As stated above the only 1natter which can be re-
viewed by the appellant courts where the evidence is 
not before it is whether the charge is a correct statement 
of law. In this respect there is no question but that 
Instruction No. 11 contains a correct state1nent of the 
law. 
Section 60-5-!, U.C.A. 1953, (subparagraphs 6 & 7), 
sets forth the 1neasure of dmnages for breach of a war-
ranty as follows: 
"6. The measure of dmnages for breach of \Yar-
ranty is the loss directly and naturally resulting 
in the ordinary course of events from the breach 
of warranty. 
7. In the case of breach of warranty of quality, 
such loss, in the absence of special circumstances 
showing proximate dmnaqe of a greater amount, 
is the difference between the value of goods at 
the time of delivery to the buyer and the value 
they would have had if they had answered to the 
warranty." (Emphasis added) 
Under the foregoing provisions of the statute it was 
necessary for the Court to define the phrase proximate 
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damage or proximate cause. Howt>ver, the pertinent 
instruction on the 1neasure of darnages i:-; Instruction 
No. 29 (R. 69) which reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that Section 60-5-7, l~tah 
Code Annotated 1953, insofar as applicable here 
provides that 'The measure of damages for 
breach of warranty is the loss directly and natur-
ally resulting in the ordinary course of events 
from the breach of warranty.' 
If you find the issues in favor of the De-
fendant and against the Plaintiff on Defendant'~ 
Counterclaim, it will be your duty to award the 
Defendant such dmnages, if any, as you may find 
from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly 
and adequately c01npensate him for the damage 
he has sustained as a proxilnate result of the 
breach of warranty.'' 
Insofar as this writer can re1ne1nber, this instruction 
was never excepted by Appellant, although Appellant 
did object to the definition of the tenn "proximate 
cause" as given by the Court in Instruction No. 11 after 
it had been given. 
There was considerable testi1nony from experts 
other than Dr. Bagley as to the effect the drafts and 
exposure caused by the defective equip1nent would have 
on the young turkey poults. They gave as their opinion 
that death under the circu1nstances related was caused 
by such condition. 
The fact that the jury found in favor of the Re-
spondent against Appellant for only $8,000.00 of the 
clain1 which excluded $25,000.00 in actual dan1age is 
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indicative of the fact that the jury also detennined that 
:-;ome of the loss was due to other factors and causes. 
lt seems that Appellant has no basis for con1plaint when 
the jury has exonerated it frmn liability for a substantial 
portion of the lo,ss which Respondent sustained. 
Appellant cmnplains of Instruction No. 16 because 
it does not give all of the provisions of the statute with 
respect to implied warranty. However, Respondent over-
looks the fact that Instruction No. 23 relates to the 
exceptions given under the statue and was given at 
the instance of Appellant to cover the particular situa-
tion which Appellant urges in his brief. If Appellant 
felt that this instruction did not adequately cover the 
matter he should have directed the Court's attention 
to it in order that the Court could have given a more 
complete instruction. However, Respondent's position is 
that the evidence did not justify the submission to the 
jury of either of the ite1ns contained in subsections 2 or 
3 of Section 60-1-15, and therefo,re that the Court should 
not have given even the instruction No. 23 referred to. 
Insofar as this writer is able to ascertain no excep-
tion was taken to the Court's Instruction No. 18. The 
only claim nmv made is that is pennitted the jury to 
inquire as to whether the financal transactions were 
such as were darned by the Plaintiff in this case or as 
claimed by the Defendant. Since this was a n1atter 
which was in issue betewen the parties and on which 
evidence was introduced, there seems to be no reason 
why this instruction should not have been given. 
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The Appellant further cmnplains because the Court 
gave Instruction K o. 33 relating to two verdict fonns, 
one verdict fonn which required the Jury to find against 
the Defendant on the counterclaim and the other which 
permitted the Jury to find in favor of the Defendant 
on the counterclain1 without specifying whether it was 
one or both of the Counts. The form of the verdict 
is within the discretion of the trial court. The verdict 
forms permitted the Jury to find against Respondent 
or in his favor and to assess the runount of the damage~ 
if they found he was entitled to recover. Since the 
e'vidence was sufficient to find in favor of the Respon-
dent on both counts there can be no reason why Appel-
lant should cornplain because they were not separated 
in the ve·rdict form. 
POINT VI 
ALLEGED ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAIN-
TIFF A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellant complains because the Court failed to 
grant its motion for a new trial. In stating the circum-
stances giving rise to the 1natter of 1noving for a new 
trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, Ap-
pe,llant states that "A request was made for a contin-
uance after the Defendant had rested and before re-
buttal testilnony was had, and the Court allowed the 
Plaintiff a few minutes in which to obtain the necessary 
witnesses. Unfortunately, the Plaintiff was not able 
to obtain witnesses necessary to establish the facts 
attached to its 1notion for a new trial." The fact of 
the matter is that near the close of the trial and some 
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time before it concluded, Appellant re-subpoened one 
of Plaintiff's witnesses, to-wit: Glen \Yilson, to corne 
bac:k into Court, and also issued a subpoena for two 
other individuals, one of whom was in fact subpoened 
and ca1ne to Court. .Mr. Glen Wilson was interrogated 
at some length by counsel for Appellant in respect to 
the 1natter of the water used in connection with the 
turkc•y operation in the year in question, and specifially 
aske<l whether the water 1nay have caused the death 
of any of the turkeys. l\lr. Wilson testified that turkeys 
had been brooded on the property for 1nany years prior 
to 1958-59 with no difficulty and that in the years sub-
~equent thereto the san1e water had been used until1962 
and that there had been no abnonnal mortality resulting 
therefrom. This evidence was introduced by Appellant, 
\dlO had subpoened Glen Wilson. The other witness 
did not arrive at the courtroom at the time the case 
was concluded, and the Court thereupon continued the 
matter for approximately an hour in order for the 
\\itness to be located and brought into court. When 
the witness arrived, counsel for Appellant asked for a 
recess for him to interrogate the witness and did so, 
after which he returned to the courtroom and stated 
that he did not wish to call this person as a witness. 
This, of course, could be construed only as indicating 
that this witness would not testify as the Appellant 
hoped he would do. Insofar as any other witness is 
concerned, Appellant asked for no continuance in the 
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trial in nrder to obtain additional evidence, nor did he 
ask the Court to grant pennission for further time in 
which to investigate the matters which apparently he 
claiu1s came to his attention during the trial. 
In view of these circumstance:-;, it is our position 
that the case of Lindsey vs. Eccles liotel Company, 
3 U. 2d 364, 284 P2d 477. is applicable. There the Plain-
tiff urged that a ne,,· trial should have been granted 
because of newly discovered evidence when the Plain-
tiff had two days before the trial discovered a 1naterial 
witness who was ill. He did not, ho·wever, request the 
Court for a continuance of the trial or state that one of 
his important witnesses would not be available at the 
trial. Thereafter, upon losing the case he filed a motion 
for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. 
The motion was denied. On appeal this Court affirmed, 
stating: "In such an atmosphere we cannot say the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new 
trial under Rule 59 (a) ( 4), r tah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure." 
Again 1n the case of Thorley vs. /( olob F·ish and 
Game Cftnb, 13 U. 2d 294, 373 P2d 514, in affirming the 
trial court's refusal to grant a new trial, this Court said: 
•·Insofar as the denial of appellant's motion 
for a new trial or for leave to reopen is concerned, 
we are not persuaded that the court abused its 
discretion in denying the n1otion. The main 
ground for the n1otion was ne\dy discovered evi-
dence which consisted of testinwny of an engineer 
who has by affidavit stated that the plaintiff 
could not be <:-redited with placing 8,400 cubic 
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yard~ of material in the drun since there was 
only 3,500 cubic yards moved; and therefore, the 
plaintiff Inust have been paid on a lump sum 
figure basj s, and not on a cost per yard basis. 
This testiinony has the tendency of i1npeaching 
the plaintiff and there is no reason shown why 
appellant did not produce such evidence at the 
trial. This n1otion was properly denied by the 
lower court because the appellants did no't con1-
ply with Rule 59 (c) in filing the affidavit timely. 
(The affidavit was filed 43 days after the entry 
of judgment). vVe do not ordinarily disturb the 
ruling of the trial court in denying a motion for 
a new trial unless there has been abuse on the 
part of the trial judge, which is not present here." 
In the instant case Appellant assigns no reason 
why the testimony, if any, which would now be produced 
could not have been produced at the initial trial . In 
any event there is no testimony .and would be no testi-
mony to the effect that the mineral content of the water 
used in the year 1958-1959 was the same as that tested 
by the chemists in the year 1962. Appellant had adequate 
opportunity to cheek the \Vater before trial and called 
two witnesses in respect to the Inatter. However, Appel-
lant's argument at the tilne of trial w.as that the mortal-
ity of the turkeys \\·as due to specific diseases which 
were identified in the autopsies on one or two of the 
birds and that death did not occur because of any other 
factors. It now seeks to reverse its position and elai1n 
some other cause or contributing cause which is not sup-
ported by the evidence since we have no way of deter-
mining what the 1nineral content of the water was in 
1958-1959. 
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We respectfully submit that the n1atter of whether 
a new trial should be granted upon newly discovered 
evidence or otherwise is one which rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and that in the absence 
of a clear abuse of dscretion the determination of the 
trial court should not be overruled. Again, since the 
testimony at the trial is put before this Court, it must 
presume that the trial court was more familiar with the 
facts and the evidence and that it acted within its 
judicial prerogative in denying Appellant's n1otion for 
a new trial. 
CONCLUSIOX 
Respondent respectfully urges that the matters 
raised by Appellant in its brief are without Inerit and 
that no error was com1nitted by the trial court in any 
of the matters referred to. In any event, Respondent 
desires to refer the Court to Rule 61, r.R.C.P. which 
provides: 
"No error in either the admission or exclu-
sion of evidence, and no error or defect in any 
ruling or order or anything done or mnitted by 
the Court or by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judg1nent or order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the Court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The Court at every stage of 
the proceeding 1nust disregard any error or de-
feet in the proceeding W'hich does not effect the 
substantial rights of the parties." 
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In this conection, Respondent respectfully subn1its 
that Appellant has failed to show wherein anything done 
or omitted to be done by the trial court resulted in any 
substantial injustice, and therefore the judgn1ent should 
be affin11ed. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
KIELSEN, CONDER and HANSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, lTtah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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